n8n Git Node RCE: Patch, Restrict and Review Your Automation

n8n’s Git Node RCE: When Your Automation Platform Becomes the Attack Vector — Patch Now

What happened (short and sharp)

Today a critical vulnerability (CVE-2025-65964) affecting the open‑source workflow automation platform n8n was disclosed. Versions 0.123.1 through 1.119.1 allow remote code execution via the Git node’s handling of Git configuration: a workflow can set arbitrary Git configuration values such as core.hooksPath, which an attacker can point at a malicious Git hook that executes commands on the host during later Git operations. The issue is fixed in n8n 1.119.2; mitigations include excluding the Git node and avoiding cloning or using untrusted repositories with the Git node.

Why this hurts businesses

If you run n8n to automate back‑office tasks, sync data or trigger deployments, this is not a niche developer problem — it’s a platform with direct access to systems and data. Workflow automation tools are often given broad privileges to reduce friction, and non‑technical staff may be authorised to create or modify workflows. That combination turns a convenience into a high‑impact attack surface: an attacker who can alter a workflow or trick a user into using a malicious repo can translate that foothold into host‑level code execution.

Organisations worry about exactly this: unauthorised access to sensitive data, hidden persistence on critical servers, unexpected service disruption, emergency patching costs, contract and regulatory fallout, and the reputational damage that follows a breach carried out by a tool you trusted to make life easier.

How this plays out if ignored

Ignore it and the scenarios become painfully plausible. An adversary could embed a stealthy backdoor in a hook, wait for normal Git activity, then trigger remote commands under the platform’s identity — perhaps reaching databases, cloud credentials or file shares. Recovery could mean rebuilding hosts, auditing every workflow, rotating credentials, notifying customers and regulators, and proving you weren’t negligent. In short: hours of expensive incident work, weeks of investigation and a longer tail of lost trust.

Where ISO 27001 and good practice would have helped (and how they can help now)

This vulnerability is a textbook example of why an information security management system matters. ISO 27001’s controls would help prevent and limit impact through several routes:

• Asset inventory and classification (A.8) — know where automation platforms sit, what privileges they hold and what data they touch.

• Access control and least privilege (A.9) — ensure workflows and nodes run with the minimum necessary rights; don’t let automation be an all‑access pass.

• Secure development and change management (A.14) — enforce code review, approvals and testing for workflows that interact with external repositories or execute code.

• Operational procedures and hardening (A.12) — restrict which nodes/plugins are available to which teams; network‑segregate automation hosts; limit Git interactions to trusted sources.

• Supplier relationships and third‑party security (A.15/A.18) — treat dependencies and repositories as suppliers: validate and monitor them, and include security requirements in contracts.

• Incident management and lessons learned (A.16) — have tested playbooks for workflow/platform compromise to reduce downtime and speed recovery.

If you want a focused framework to formalise those steps, consider reading how ISO 27001 helps: https://synergosconsultancy.co.uk/iso27001/ — it’s not an instant magic spell, but it turns scattershot security into consistent practice. For keeping trading through disruption — tested backups, continuity plans and alternate ways to run essential processes — ISO 22301 is the go‑to: https://synergosconsultancy.co.uk/iso-22301-business-continuity-management-system-bcms/.

Practical, no‑nonsense steps to take immediately

Patch first: upgrade any vulnerable n8n instances to 1.119.2 where possible. If you cannot patch straight away, apply the vendor‑suggested mitigations: disable or exclude the Git node and refuse to interact with untrusted repositories via n8n’s Git functionality.

• Review who can create or edit workflows and apply stricter approval/segregation of duties.

• Reduce host privileges for automation services — give them only the access they need and nothing more.

• Network‑segregate automation runtimes from sensitive systems and credentials; hold vaulted secrets outside automations when feasible.

• Audit existing workflows for use of the Git node and any dynamic configuration steps; log and alert on repository changes and unusual hook paths.

• Test your incident playbook — practise removing an automation server from the network and restoring critical processes another way, because untested backups are like parachutes you’ve never opened.

These aren’t radical asks — they’re sensible hygiene that saves weeks of crisis response and a potential regulatory headache.

Technology + process = less panic

Tooling alone won’t stop every exploit, and policies alone won’t stop human error. The sweet spot is combining technical controls (patching, segmentation, least privilege, secure defaults) with process (change control, approvals, supplier checks) and people (awareness about using untrusted repos). If you want resources on awareness training or Cyber Essentials to raise baseline hygiene, Synergos’ pages on security awareness and IASME/Cyber Essentials are useful complements to ISO work: https://synergosconsultancy.co.uk/usecure and https://synergosconsultancy.co.uk/iasme-certifications/.

Finally, remember that automation platforms are often business‑critical — they aren’t toys. Treat them like servers that hold customer data and you’ll be better placed to keep the lights on when something goes wrong.

Nudge (yes, this is the nudge): review your automation estate this week. If you find n8n instances, prioritise patching and apply restrictions to the Git node until you’re comfortable they’re safe.